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Abstract
Two identification schemes based on the Maurer-Yacobi ID-based cryptosys-
tem are analysed and shown to suffer from serious security problems.
1 Introduction
Tseng and Jan [1] proposed a user identification scheme (referred to as the
TJ scheme) based on an identity-based (ID-based) non-interactive public
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key distribution system due to Maurer and Yacobi [2]. Hwang, Lo and Lin
[3] have proposed a further scheme, based on the TJ scheme, designed for
use in the mobile environment (we refer to this as the HLL scheme). The
authors of both schemes [1, 3] claim that they are secure. However, we show
that both schemes suffer from serious security problems.
The reminder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review
the TJ and HLL schemes. In Section 3, we describe the security problems.
In Section 4, brief conclusions are provided.
2 Review of the TJ and HLL schemes
Both schemes possess the same system initialisation phase. A trusted au-
thority (TA) is required to perform the following initialisation steps.
• Select prime numbers pj (1 ≤ j ≤ 4) each 60–70 decimal digits long,
where the values pj−12 are odd and pairwise relatively prime. Put
N = p1p2p3p4.
• Select a random number e ∈ Z∗φ(N), and compute d satisfying ed ≡ 1
(mod φ(N)). Select another random number t in Z∗φ(N).
• Select a value g such that g is a primitive element in GF (pj) for every
j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 4, and a one-way function h.
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TA publishes {N, g, e, h} and keeps {p1, p2, p3, p4, t, d} secret. When a user
wishes to join the system, he presents his unique identifier ID to the TA.
The TA then computes
s = et logg(ID
2) mod φ(N)
and sends s to the user as his private key and publishes ID as his public key.
Note that here, as throughout, logg x (the discrete logarithm of x to the base
g) means the smallest non-negative integer y such that gy ≡ x (mod N).
Note that the existence of the discrete logarithm necessary to compute s was
established by Maurer and Yacobi [2]; computing this discrete logarithm is
feasible by computing the base g logarithm of ID2 modulo pj − 1 for each j,
and then combining the values (again as described in [2]).
2.1 Identification phase of the TJ scheme
Suppose Alice (with identity IDa) wishes to identify herself to Bob (with
identity IDb). She follows the steps below.
1. Alice sends her identity IDa to Bob.
2. Bob chooses a random integer k in Z∗N and sends Y = (IDb)
2k mod N
to Alice.
3. On receiving Y , Alice computes and sends Z = Y sa mod N to Bob.
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4. Bob checks the equation Z = (IDa)2ksb mod N . If the check succeeds,
then Bob has confirmed that Alice possesses the identity IDa.
2.2 Identification phase of the HLL scheme
Suppose a mobile user (with identity IDm) wishes to identify himself to the
base station (with identity IDb). The following steps are performed.
1. The mobile user chooses a random k in Z∗N and sends {IDm, Y, Z, T} to
the base station, where T is a time-stamp and Y and Z are computed
as follows:
Y = (IDm)2k modN
Z = (IDb)2ksmT modN
2. On receiving {IDm, Y, Z, T}, the base station computes Z ′ = Y sbT
mod N . If Z
′
= Z, then the base station has confirmed that the
mobile user possesses the identity IDm.
3 Cryptanalysis of the TJ and HLL schemes
The following security problems exist in the TJ and HLL schemes.
1. In the TJ scheme, an impersonation attack can be mounted because
of the fact that Alice replies to the challenge Y , which should be from
Bob, without authenticating its origin.
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Suppose an attacker can freely manipulate the messages sent between
Alice and Bob in the TJ scheme; then he can also impersonate Alice to
any valid user except Alice. To impersonate Alice to Eve, the attack
can be mounted as follows.
(a) When Alice sends her identity IDa to Bob, the attacker also sends
IDa to Eve.
(b) The attacker then intercepts the reply message sent from Bob to
Alice, and prevents it reaching Alice.
(c) After receiving IDa from the attacker (masquerading as Alice),
Eve chooses a random integer k in Z∗N and sends Y = (IDe)
2k mod
N to the attacker. After receiving Y , the attacker impersonates
Bob to forward it to Alice.
(d) On receiving Y , Alice computes and sends Z = Y sa mod N to
Bob. The attacker intercepts this message and sends it to Eve.
(e) Eve checks whether the equation Z = (IDa)2kse mod N holds,
which it will. Eve now believes that the attacker possesses the
identity IDa. That is, Eve believes she is talking to Alice, whereas
Alice believes she is talking to Bob.
To mount this attack, the attacker only needs to monitor the activities
of Alice. It can be mounted whenever Alice initiates a new run of the
identification protocol.
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2. In the HLL scheme a time-stamp T is used to prevent replay attacks;
however an attacker can still deploy a replay attack because of the way
in which the time-stamp T is used.
Suppose the attacker has intercepted {IDm, Y, Z, T} in a previous run
of the identification scheme. Then the attacker can initiate a new run
of the identification protocol as follows.
(a) The attacker constructs and sends {IDm, Y ∗, Z∗, T ∗} to the base
station, where T ∗ is the current time-stamp, Y ∗ = Y T mod N ,
and Z∗ = ZT ∗ mod N .
(b) On receiving {IDm, Y ∗, Z∗, T ∗}, the base station computes Z ′ =
(Y ∗)sbT ∗ mod N . Because Z ≡ Y sbT (mod N) in the previous
run of the identification protocol, it is easy to verify that Z
′
=
Z∗ will hold. The base station now believes that the attacker
possesses the identity IDm.
3. In the HLL scheme, the identity of the mobile user is not involved in the
verification by the base station, so that an attacker can impersonate
any mobile user except Alice to the base station when Alice tries to
identify herself to the base station.
To mount this attack, the attacker only needs to replace {IDm, Y, Z, T}
with {IDx, Y, Z, T} in step 1 of the protocol run, where IDx is the
identity of the mobile user that the attacker wishes to impersonate.
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The validity of the attack is obvious.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that serious security problems exist in two identification
schemes based on an ID-based cryptosystem.
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